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Abstract. Identity management is a key component of information-
system security. In the context of service-oriented architectures (SOA),
federated identity management (FIM) is important. Nowadays, business-
process management (BPM) is used for diverse applications to orches-
trate activities of web services and humans in SOA. Involving humans in
business processes implies a notion of identity. Nevertheless, the relation-
ship between FIM and BPM has not been systematically examined until
now. We perform such an analysis, which yields the characteristics of
FIM concepts in BPM. Based on standards for BPM, access control and
FIM, we propose an architecture of a BPM system with FIM support
and discuss design alternatives. The system implements FIM concepts
based on declarative conﬁguration, taking the run-time context of busi-
ness processes into account. Finally, we describe our implementation of
the architecture based on the ZXID open-source library.
1 Introduction
Identity is “a property of a subject that enables it to be identiﬁable and to link
items of interest to the subject” [27]. Digital identity refers to attribute values
attributed to an individual which are immediately accessible by technical means.
Individuals expose diﬀerent parts of their identity in diﬀerent contexts. Identity
management (IdM) means managing these various partial identities.
IdM is important for information-system security, for authentication and ac-
cess control in particular. An identity-management system has to check the iden-
tiﬁers and attribute values that a subject claims to possess, i.e., authenticate the
identity of the subject. On this basis, a system can decide whether to grant the
subject access to some resource.
Federated identity management (FIM) is a set of technologies and processes
that let computer systems distribute identity information dynamically and dele-
gate IdM functionality to other systems [15]. A FIM allows service providers to
oﬄoad the cost of managing user attributes and login credentials to an identity
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provider, thereby increasing scalability. It also provides users with single-sign-on
(SSO), making it easier to use services from diﬀerent providers [3].
We summarize the current status of FIM as follows: Terminology and con-
cepts have been established, and requirements on FIM have been explored. There
are implementations of FIM concepts, e. g., based on the Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) [25]. However, there are no established concepts for
higher-level applications of FIM, such as in policy management or in business
processes (BPs).
Business-process management (BPM) is well-suited to orchestrate the behav-
ior of loosely-coupled systems in service-oriented architectures (SOA). Common
BPs involve services as well as human users, implying a notion of identity. Autho-
rization constraints restrict who is allowed to perform activities based on this no-
tion and a relationship between activities. Separation of duty (SoD) [8] requires
diﬀerent users for two or more activities. With binding of duty (BoD) [28], the
same user has to perform several activities. A BPM system (BPMS) requires au-
thentic attributes of users: First, it needs to decide whether a user may perform
a speciﬁc actitivity. Second, BPs dealing with personally-identiﬁable informa-
tion (PII) cannot guarantee correct results without authentic input. They also
depend on user preferences. E.g., a user might have speciﬁed which data he is
willing to disclose to applications of a speciﬁc kind. When a process can access
such preferences, it can avoid bothering the user unnecessarily. It is important
to note that BPM is a generic technology with diverse applications. Individual
process deﬁnitions will use the features of a BPMS diﬀerently, and the BPMS
has to support this.
Integrating FIM support into a BPMS facilitates what we call identity busi-
ness processes, allowing developers of BP applications to easily use the ser-
vices available in an IdM federation. The necessary conﬁguration could be very
lightweight, and the application developer can provide it as annotations to the
process model [16]. For example, to use FIM for access control, he needs to state
the attribute values required from users to perform an activity of the process.
In return, users can use SSO to log into the user interface, and the system au-
tomatically authenticates the attributes of the user and compares them to the
required ones. Further, users have a more consistent experience when using dif-
ferent service providers: They can easily re-use existing accounts and provide
access to their PII to applications automatically. In addition, applications can
respect their personal privacy preferences automatically.
The research question now is how to design a BPMS for identity BPs. Prob-
lems that need to be solved are: How to extend the conventional architecture
of a BPMS to support FIM concepts? How can advanced BPMS functional-
ity in SOA beneﬁt from FIM? Which conﬁguration is needed to customize the
implementation of FIM features to diﬀerent BP deﬁnitions?
All these problems are challenging. First, it is unclear how FIM ﬁts into the
architecture of a secure BPMS: Which interfaces of the classical BPMS architec-
ture [5] are aﬀected, i. e., have to interact with the FIM system or handle identity
information? Which components of the BPMS use such information? Second, the
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resulting BPMS should re-use existing BPMS components, interoperate with es-
tablished FIM technologies, and allow execution of existing process deﬁnitions
with little additional conﬁguration. Third, the implementation of FIM features
needs to take the process context into account and adjust to the requirements of
individual process deﬁnitions. One example would be a travel-booking applica-
tion involving a traveler and a clerk. After the booking is completed, the traveler
agrees to store itinerary data in his calendar. The BPMS needs to discover the
correct calendar service and call it with the correct identity. Fourth, the resulting
BPMS must maintain user privacy. To this end, it must support the respective
FIM features, like identity mapping between pseudonyms, prevent leaking of
identity information between process instances, and increase user control over
the disclosure of their PII.
Our contributions now are as follows:
– We analyze how FIM concepts can be used in BPs, and describe peculiarities
that arise when combining them with BPM concepts.
– We describe architecture extensions of a BPMS that allow for secure process
execution in SOA with FIM.
– We describe how to make BPM more user-centric by addressing individual
user preferences using FIM (e. g., personalized trust policies).
– We say how to implement the extensions using the open-source ZXID library.
This report is structured as follows: We explain fundamental concepts and
technologies in Section 2. We then analyze the requirements on our system (Sec-
tion 3), followed by the actual system design (Section 4). We then brieﬂy explain
our implementation in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Fundamentals and Related Work
2.1 Business-process management in SOA
The WfMC reference model [5] deﬁnes an architecture for BPMS, consisting of
several interfaces. The central component is the BP execution engine (engine).
Interface 1 facilitates the deployment of process deﬁnitions. This includes the
security conﬁguration of process deﬁnitions. Interface 2 handles interactions of
the BPMS with users via human tasks through the worklist handler. Interfaces 3
and 4 handle the interaction with applications and other BPMS. Interface 5 deals
with administration and monitoring. In SOA, process deﬁnitions commonly use
WS-BPEL [24]. Applications and other processes are provided as web services
using SOAP [29].
Next to accomplishing application functionality, a BPMS has to deal with
the challenges of a SOA concerning security and dynamism: Services used in
processes often need to be selected at run-time. When dealing with PII, users
should be able to inﬂuence which service is selected. It should be easy for appli-
cation developers to specify this. For encrypted connections, it is necessary to
acquire the public keys of the services invoked. Access control for human tasks
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Fig. 1. Architecure of a BPMS with security extensions
is based on the state of process instances (namely constraints involving several
tasks) and a policy speciﬁc to the process model. We also have found that some
security-related interactions with users are frequent, such as agreeing to terms of
service, or selecting a service provider. [16] gives a systematic overview of such
interactions, called user involvements.
To deal with these additional requirements, we have proposed architecture
extensions to the WfMC reference model [17]. Figure 1 is a simpliﬁed diagram of
this architecture. The important changes are: (1) Communication of the engine
with the worklist handler and with web services is routed through proxies, called
Policy Enforcement Point for Human Tasks (PEP-HT) and Policy Enforcement
Point for Web Services (PEP-WS), respectively. The PEP-HT persists the con-
text a human task was created in and handles access-control requests relating to
human tasks. The PEP-WS routes calls to the correct service, checks its trust-
worthiness and applies encryption and cryptographic signatures. (2) Process
deﬁnitions are instrumented so that they send web-service calls or human tasks
to the PEP-WS/PEP-HT, including appropriate context (i. e., which activity
in which process instance has caused the request). (3) The PEP-WS invokes a
service-discovery component to ﬁnd available services and checks their trustwor-
thiness by sending a request to a Trust PDP. (4) The Business-Process Policy
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Decision Point (BP-PDP) takes access-control decisions enforced by the PEP-
HT, and the Policy Information Point (PIP) stores the history needed for these
decisions.
2.2 Identity-management concepts
In this section, we introduce FIM concepts. In Section 3, we analyze their impact
on BPM in detail.
Identity governance Governance tasks in FIM comprise (a) establishing the
relationship between users and identity providers (IdP), i.e., creating accounts,
verifying user identities by some real-world mechanism and providing credentials,
and (b) establishing a federation between an IdP and a service provider (SP),
which requires creating a trust relationship and respective conﬁguration on both
sides. In what follows, we assume that these relationships exist.
Providing identity information to SPs In FIM, an IdP (or asserting party)
asserts the correctness of identity information about a subject (user). BPs either
interact with users directly (through the worklist handler) or with web services,
which in turn can act on behalf of users. In both cases it is possible to provide
identity information to the BP: When the user wants to interact with a web-
based worklist handler, he needs to authenticate. As users access web-based
services at many diﬀerent SPs, they do not want to manage access credentials for
all of them. With SSO, the user is redirected to the IdP, which authenticates him
and asserts his identity to the SP. The other case is a user authenticating to some
other application through his IdP. The application acquires tokens testifying the
authentication of the user and uses them in web-service calls to other SPs.
Types of identity information There are diﬀerent kinds of identity-related
information that an IdP can provide: Identiﬁers are values that identify a user in
a given context. Attributes contain some statement about the user that may be
relevant for the SP (e. g., the type of driver’s license the user holds). They provide
a more ﬁne-grained alternative to roles. The IdP asserts that this information is
authentic.
Purpose of identity information Identity information is used for various
purposes. With identiﬁers, one can recognize users in order to provide a stateful
service or to enforce authorization constraints. Attributes allow to personalize
the service. For example, an application can address data for shipping, oﬀer
services available only to a certain age group, or providing information relevant
to the user’s location. Yet another purpose is authorization: Using attributes for
this purpose is known as attribute-based access control (ABAC) [30]. ABAC is a
generalization of role-based access control. It also supports attributes for objects,
actions, and the environment. It is the underlying paradigm of XACML [19].
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Pseudonyms Identiﬁers valid only in a speciﬁc context are known as pseudonyms.
They can be diﬀerent for each SP, but otherwise be persistent or even change
for each login session. Interactions between SPs require a mapping between the
diﬀerent pseudonyms used at each SP.
Identity-based services The functionality of an identity web service depends
on whom it provides a service for. This includes: (a) Services storing information
about the holder of an identity (user). These services are able to answer requests
for such information. (b) Services that interact with the user and return his
decision. (c) Services that can take a decision based on instructions from a user.
In a secure BPMS, use cases include a service that can declare the consent of
the user to terms of service based on a policy or on his choice at prior occasions.
Acting for users Services often depend on information provided by other
services. This is also true for identity web services. This means that they have to
call other identity web services on behalf of the identity that has invoked them.
2.3 Technical FIM speciﬁcations
We now brieﬂy introduce technical speciﬁcations implementing the concepts from
the previous section. This should also be useful as a reading guide to these
speciﬁcations.
SAML The fundamental data structure in the Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) [26] are assertions [18], which “carry statements about a principal
that an asserting party claims to be true”. SAML deﬁnes diﬀerent kinds of state-
ments. Authentication statements assert that the user has been authenticated
and contain means and time of the authentication. An attribute statement gives
an attribute type and value claimed to be true for the user. Identiﬁers are given
in the Subject element of the assertion, which contains a NameID element. [18]
deﬁnes diﬀerent kinds of NameIDs. Core alternatives are globally unique names
like e-mail addresses and X.509 subject names, privacy-preserving persistent
identiﬁers, which have no correspondence to an actual identiﬁer and are speciﬁc
to a given service provider, and transient identiﬁers, i. e., random and temporary
values.
[18] also deﬁnes protocols, i. e., exchanges of protocol messages, which con-
tains assertion in most cases. Examples are the Assertion Query and Request
Protocol or the Authentication Request Protocol. Note that protocols only deﬁne
messages, while bindings specify a particular transport mechanism, e. g., HTTP
POST. Proﬁles [20] deﬁne in more detail how to use SAML for a particular appli-
cation, providing for better interoperability between diﬀerent implementations.
There are two types of proﬁles. One contains a set of rules describing how to
embed SAML assertions into or extract them from a framework or protocol. The
other one describes how to use SAML features in a particular context by spec-
ifying further details left open in the core speciﬁcation. An important example
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is the Web Browser SSO Proﬁle, which implements the Authentication Request
Protocol using the HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST and HTTP Artifact bindings.
It allows to transfer identity information from an IdP to a web frontend of an
SP.
The SAML Token Proﬁle of WS-Security [22] allows using SAML assertions
as tokens in WS-Security [23] headers of SOAP messages. The SP receiving the
message has to validate the evidence provided by the caller according to the
conﬁrmation method speciﬁed in the assertion (e. g., that the sender holds a
speciﬁc key).
ID-WSF The Liberty Alliance has developed ID-WSF [11], a framework for
identity web services. The SOAP binding [14] provides an invocation framework
for identity services. It deﬁnes technical details like SOAP headers and sta-
tus codes. The ID-WSF Security Mechanisms speciﬁcation [10] deﬁnes the use
of tokens for message authentication, including tokens that specify the invok-
ing identity. [9] speciﬁes how to use SAML assertions as authentication tokens.
In addition, ID-WSF deﬁnes an SSO Service that allows a system to obtain
SAML assertions as security tokens. It also deﬁnes an Identity Mapping Service
that translates references to users into alternative formats or identiﬁer names-
paces [12]. The Discovery Service speciﬁcation [13] deﬁnes a data format to
describe (identity) web services and speciﬁes a service that detects services of a
certain type available to a given identity.
XACML XACML [19] is a language for access-control policies. It includes a
reference architecture and format for decision requests and results. The SAML
2.0 Proﬁle of XACML 2.0 [21] deﬁnes an extension of XACML authorization-
decision queries, so that SAML attributes can be transmitted to the PDP. This
allows to use identity information for authorization directly.
2.4 Related work
We are not aware of any work systematically combining BPM and FIM, except
for [4]. It proposes extensions for a BPEL engine to let processes access the
content of security tokens. This approach only considers web-service interactions
and requires explicit activities accessing the information. Our approach also
addresses user interactions (through human tasks). It covers the whole range of
FIM concepts and allows declarative conﬁguration of respective mechanisms. In
fact, [4] is one possibility to give processes access to proﬁle information contained
in tokens (see F11 in Section 4.1).
3 Requirements Analysis
This section addresses two issues: First, we explain how some general require-
ments for FIM applications are relevant for BPM. Second, we analyze the charac-
teristics individual FIM concepts exhibit in BPM and the resulting requirements.
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3.1 General requirements
The laws of identity [2] are recommendations for FIM implementations, mainly
concerning interoperability, privacy, and user control. They are the result of
intensive discussions within the identity-management community. We now derive
requirements on the implementation of FIM features in a secure BPMS.
One law requires that the system “must only reveal information identifying a
user with the user’s consent”. Regarding BPM, this applies to process instances
and third-party services in particular. A BPMS should control disclosure of iden-
tifying information to them. Another law requires “unidirectional” identiﬁers
valid only for one SP to prevent combination of identity information provided
to diﬀerent parties. In BPM, this means isolation between process instances.
Third, there should be a pluralism of operators and technologies, and “multi-
ple identity systems run by multiple identity providers” should be supported.
Our solution will use standard FIM technologies (cf. Section 2.3) and can in-
teroperate with multiple identity providers. The architecture should be based
on generic concepts and their application to BPM, to be independent of the
concrete technology. Finally, the identity system should provide “unambiguous
human-machine communication mechanisms oﬀering protection against identity
attacks”. A BPMS helps by providing the same authentication mechanisms for
diﬀerent kinds of applications. The BPMS should also allow re-using predeﬁned
interactions for, say, giving consent, choosing service providers information is
disclosed to, etc.
3.2 Individual FIM concepts
BPM is a generic technology for diﬀerent kinds of applications. Hence, a BPMS
needs to support diﬀerent security concepts, including identity management,
even though not every application will use all of them. In addition, the mecha-
nisms provided by the BPMS must be conﬁgurable to fulﬁll the security require-
ments of diﬀerent applications.
In the following, we develop requirements on the integration of diﬀerent FIM
concepts into a BPMS. First, we explore the relationship of these concepts to
activities and other entities, such as users or external services, related to BP
instances. This aﬀects how the BPMS needs to process identity information at
run time. Second, we examine how the requirements of diﬀerent applications
regarding a concept can diﬀer. We look at how a respective conﬁguration can be
expressed based on the elements of process deﬁnitions. This allows us to decide
which mechanisms are needed in the BPMS to support FIM, and which instance-
speciﬁc data the BPMS needs consider. This forms the basis for mapping the
required functionality to an architecture and its implementation.
The list of FIM concepts considered here is based on the one introduced in
Section 2.2, but we structure the items diﬀerently, taking their importance for
BPM into account.
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Governance of the FIM network The only governance task involving the
BPMS is the establishment of a federation between the BPMS and the IdPs to
be used. This does not aﬀect individual processes and thus does not require any
conﬁguration.
SSO In a BPMS, users interact with the worklist handler through a web-based
interface to perform human tasks. To authenticate to the worklist handler, they
use SSO. The handler needs to store identity information for the duration of the
respective SSO sessions. When a user tries to perform a task, the information is
used for authorization. When the user has performed a task, the identity infor-
mation is stored, remembering the relation to the activity and process instance
in question. We do not see any need, however, to conﬁgure how to perform SSO.
Incoming identity-WS calls The BPMS may also receive web-service calls
containing identity information. In this case, authorization for the message can
happen immediately. If successful, the identity information is connected to the
activity and process instance receiving the call. Again, there is no need to con-
ﬁgure the acquisition process itself.
ABAC ABAC uses attributes of users to decide whether access on some entity
should be granted. In BPM, this concerns human tasks as well as service calls
directed to process instances in the name of a user. The access-control decision
can be taken for each such process activity individually. The attributes required
depend on the application. Thus, BP deﬁnitions must speciﬁy the attributes
needed for each task.
History-based constraints BPs are potentially long-running, stateful, and
can involve several users performing tasks. Authorization needs to take the re-
lationship between tasks into account. A typical SoD constraint requires two
diﬀerent users for the Authorize payment and Issue cheque activities. To this
end, the BPMS must remember for each BP instance who has performed the
tasks. Pseudonyms must be persistent, otherwise constraints cannot be correctly
enforced. Application developers must specify constraints for each BP deﬁnition.
Using attributes for a personalized service Business processes coordinate
web services and human activities. In particular, they compose web services
providing services for a speciﬁc user. Depending on the application, the user’s
attributes can help to customize the service to him. For example, a BP for book-
ing a rental car can exclude premium-category vehicles when the driver’s license
of the user is less than two years old. Such customizations take the connection of
identiﬁed users with process instances into account, and of course their identity
information. However, the actual mechanisms used highly depend on the individ-
ual application. The task of the BPMS solely is to provide user attributes to BP
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instances, which process this information according to the process deﬁnition. It
must be possible for developers of BP applications to state whose attributes are
needed. One way to accomplish this is by referring to an activity in the process,
and thus the identity which has performed this activity.
Acting on behalf of users When BPs invoke identity web services, they
do so on behalf of a user. This means that the BPMS needs to store identity
information acquired by activities to use it for outgoing calls. A characteristic
of BPs is that more than one user can be involved, and that activities triggered
by one user might not be executed immediately, but only after some condition
is fullﬁlled. E. g., approval by another user might be necessary. Accordingly, it is
not immediately clear on whose behalf the BPMS needs to make a call. For each
outgoing call to an identity web service in BP deﬁnitions, the source of identity
information must be speciﬁed. Again, this can be accomplished by referring to
an activity and the identity information of the user who has performed it.
3.3 Summary
We have explored the relationship between requirements on FIM applications
and FIM concepts on the one hand, and BPM on the other hand. The latter
has resulted in an assessment of the run-time context and of the conﬁguration
needed to implement the features.
4 System Design
In this section, we derive the structure of a BPMS for identity BPs, i. e., its
components, their functionality, and the interactions between them. In Section
3.2, we have analyzed the FIM concepts and their characteristics relevant for
BPM. These are the features our system has to provide. In particular, we have
outlined how the context of BP instances inﬂuences the FIM implementation,
and where conﬁguration is needed. In addition, the entire system should fulﬁll
general requirements on FIM applications, as introduced in Section 3.1, namely:
The system should disclose PII only with user consent, isolate BP instances
against correlation of identity information, provide interoperability and support
competing FIM technologies, and ensure unambiguous human-machine interac-
tion. Finally, the following design goals are important, and ease implementation
and system maintenance:
D1 Traceability: We want to assign responsibility for a security-relevant func-
tion to one component. This reduces complexity and makes it easier to guarantee
correct behavior of the system.
D2 Abstraction from technologies: We need to distinguish between a concrete
implementation and the generic FIM concepts and provide a concrete and a
generic layer with a lean interface between them. BPM-speciﬁc functionality
should only work with the generic view on FIM. This allows to use existing FIM
libraries, and to replace them when necessary.
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D3 Standards-based architecture: The architecture of our system and its in-
teractions with the environment should be based on established standard archi-
tectures and technologies. This includes the WfMC workﬂow reference model [5],
the reference architecture of XACML [19], and the use cases of the SAML pro-
ﬁles [25].
D4 Declarative conﬁguration: As mentioned in Section 3.2, the system must
be conﬁgurable to support the security requirements of diﬀerent applications. In
principle, there are two alternatives: (1) The system provides implementations of
the concepts, with operations that allow an application BP to set conﬁguration
options based on its internal state. This requires explicit, imperative-style code
in the application. (2) Deﬁnitions of application BP include declarative-style
conﬁgurations. The system adapts to the requirements of the application by
evaluating the conﬁguration, taking the context of BP instances into account.
– We prefer (2), because this approach allows for better separation of concerns
(i. e., between the application functionality and FIM), so that a transformation
component can derive the conﬁguration from annotations of process models.
However, when application logic is closely combined with FIM functionality, the
imperative approach is inevitable. In summary, we want to provide declarative
conﬁguration wherever possible, and interfaces abstracting from technical details
otherwise.
4.1 Individual design decisions
When extending the architecture of a BPMS with the required functionality, it
is not always clear how to do this. This is because there are alternative solutions
that fulﬁll the design goals to a diﬀerent degree. We now go through diﬀerent
areas of functionality. We identify and describe design alternatives, discuss them,
and decide which one to pursue.
Identity information F1 Representation of identity information: Problem: We
need to decide on a format for representing identity information when storing
it or transferring it between components of the system. Such information con-
sists of SAML assertions (transmitted as security tokens attached to WS calls).
Several components exchange identity information: The worklist handler and the
PEP-WS acquire it. The PIP stores it, and the BP-PDP uses it for access-control
decisions. Options: (1) Always transfer complete blocks of identity information.
If a component needs a particular piece of it, it would extract it itself. (2) Store
the information centrally and only pass references. The storage layer provides an
API to access individual pieces of identity information. Discussion: The format of
the information is complex and depends on the technology used. This is an ad-
vantage of Option (2) regarding D2. Deﬁning and implementing an API requires
additional eﬀort, but this eﬀort also makes it easier to achieve D2. Conclusion:
We will use a storage layer for identity information.
F2 SSO: Problem: Users must be able to authenticate to web interfaces of
the BPMS. In the reference architecture, the worklist handler provides the only
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web interface. With FIM, the technique applicable for authentication in a web
interface is single sign-on (SSO), involving interaction with an IdP. The worklist
handler must be able to relate the identity information acquired through SSO to
any further activity of the user in the session. Conclusion: In F1 we have decided to
use a storage layer for identity information. Consequently, the worklist handler
stores the information there. We can easily accomplish re-identiﬁcation using
session cookies.
Access control F3 Access control in general : Problem: Activities in BP in-
stances can be triggered externally from two sources: Human tasks and incom-
ing web-service calls. Both are subject to access control. To this end, identity
information about users, the context of the activity (i. e., which activity in which
BP instance is triggered?), and the history of process instances is required. The
BPMS has to collect this information and take a decision. Conclusion: We will use
a central component for policy decisions, the BP-PDP, and store the history in
the PIP. This allows constraints involving both human tasks and incoming calls.
F4 Policy evaluation: Problem: Our access-control policies have two parts:
First, there are conditions deﬁning when users may perform activities. Such
conditions may refer to required attribute values or to the IdP that has asserted
the information. Their evaluation is stateless. Second, there are constraints based
on the relationship between activities in a BP instance, e. g., BoD and SoD. Such
constraints restrict access rights, and their evaluation requires history informa-
tion. Options: We have to decide whether to implement a monolithic BP-PDP or
a modular one, with separate sub-components responsible for the two diﬀerent
parts of the policy. Discussion: On the one hand, a monolithic PDP might allow
some optimizations. On the other hand, a modular PDP is more ﬂexible: First,
one can change the policy language. Second, the stateless part of the policies
heavily depends on the concrete technology. Being able to plug in an existing
implementation is favorable regarding D2. Conclusion: We choose a modular im-
plementation, because we deem a ﬂexible architecture more important. For the
stateless part, we propose using an existing PDP implementation through the
SAML proﬁle for XACML [21].
F5 Authorization constraints and pseudonyms: Problem: A problem arises
when a user has several identities, and the BPMS does not know this. Then one
can evade SoD constraints. A similar problem exists for transient pseudonyms
only valid for a limited time. As BPs often last longer, a user might access the
system with diﬀerent transient identiﬁers. Options: We see two alternatives to
deal with users who have more than one identity. (1) We can require users to be
authenticated by the same IdP for activities that are part of an SoD constraint.
For example, the users performing Authorize payment and Issue cheque would
have to be authenticated by the corporate IdP. In addition, the IdP must not
allow multiple identities for a person. (2) We can design a federation of IdPs
that asserts that two identities are diﬀerent. For transient identiﬁers, we see the
following alternatives: First, we could disallow the use of transient identiﬁers
when that kind of constraint is involved. Second, IdPs could provide a mecha-
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nism asserting the holders of two transient identiﬁers to be diﬀerent. Discussion:
Requiring a speciﬁc IdP restricts the functionality. However, this will not be rel-
evant in most cases. Consider the example from above: Both users are employees
of the same corporation, so requiring that they be authenticated by the corpo-
rate IdP is reasonable. A mechanism involving multiple IdPs requires substantial
modiﬁcations of existing protocols. Allowing a comparison of transient identi-
ﬁers would require changes in the IdP, and we deem it incompatible with the
purpose of transient identiﬁers. In contrast, we do not see any problems in dis-
allowing transient identiﬁers when they cause problems. Conclusion: In summary,
we require a speciﬁc IdP and disallow transient identiﬁers when needed.
F6 Access control in the worklist handler : Problem: Users are logged into the
worklist handler for some time. They view their worklist and perform tasks.
The handler needs to get a decision from the BP-PDP whether to include a
task in the worklist, or to allow a user to perform it. A user can also claim a
task for himself without immediately ﬁnishing it. This aﬀects the evaluation of
constraints: For instance, no other user may claim or ﬁnish another task when
BoD holds for the two tasks. We need to specify how the components interact
to perform authorization and to have the necessary history available. Conclusion:
Most of this speciﬁcation is rather obvious, given the architecture from Section
2.1. The worklist handler requests authorization from the PEP-HT, which can
look up task details from the PIP and forward the request to the BP-PDP in
turn. When users claim or complete tasks, the worklist handler informs the PEP-
HT, which registers this fact in the PIP. However, authorization requests for each
task each time the user views his worklist yield poor performance. As a solution,
we propose to cache the results for some time.
Web services F7 Incoming web-service calls: Problem: A proxy component,
the PEP-WS, receives incoming web-service calls. The tasks of the PEP-WS are
extracting identity information and making it available to other components,
performing access control, and forwarding the message to the BP engine. Some
of these points are straightforward: Identity information is handed to the storage
layer. Access control is performed by calling the BP-PDP and including the
context of the activity invoked. This poses one problem, however: Normally,
it is the BP engine that performs correlation. Correlation means determining
the context of the call, i. e., the activity and BP instance the call is directed
to. However, the BP-PDP needs this context to evaluate constraints. Further,
the PEP-WS needs it to store the identity information in the PIP. Options: We
see several approaches to this problem: (1) Re-implementing correlation in the
PEP-WS. (2) Instrumenting the process, activities receiving calls in particular:
The inserted fragment would send the ID of the BP instance and the name of
the receiving activity to the PEP-WS. With this information, the PEP-WS can
perform authorization and send the result as a reply. If authorization is denied,
the received message is discarded, and the activity is started again. (3) Closer
integration of the PEP-WS with the BP engine to perform correlation without
actually delivering the message. (4) A minimal solution supporting only calls that
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start new BP instances. For such calls, no correlation is necessary. However, the
PEP-WS must learn the ID of the newly created instance. This is possible using
a simpler process instrumentation. Discussion: We deem (1) impractical. It would
require re-implementing a substantial part of the functionality of the engine in
the PEP-WS. To accomplish this, the PEP-WS needs process state currently
not available to it, such as activities waiting for calls. (3) makes our extensions
contingent on a particular BP engine, contrary to our design objectives. (2) is
reasonable. (4) is ﬁt for a large class of applications and is easiest to implement.
Conclusion: We start with (4) and leave (2) as future work.
F8 Service discovery and selection: Problem: For outgoing calls, i.e., from the
BPs to external services, the BPMS needs to know which service to call. In many
cases, it must choose this service at run time, because user preferences have to
be considered. In detail, it needs to look up available services, choose eligible
ones according to the user’s trust policy, and ask the user for the ﬁnal choice.
Finally, the service selected is stored in the PIP. Options: We see two alternatives
each (1) to deal with personalized trust policies and (2) to involve the user. (1a)
The component that stores the policies (policy store, PS) and Trust PDP are
separate components. The BPMS retrieves the trust policy from the PS and
uses it to invoke the Trust PDP. (1b) The Trust PDP knows the trust policies
of users. Note that it depends on the user which Trust PDP should be used.
This means that discovery has to be performed. (2a) A separate UI component
can be used. (2b) The worklist handler can present tasks for service selection
in the same way as application tasks, using pre-deﬁned process fragments called
user involvements. Annotations to the process model result in the inclusion of
such fragments, cf. [16]. Discussion: (1a) discloses the trust policy to the BPMS,
(1b) does not. In addition, (1b) is more interoperable, because there currently
is no common trust-policy language in widespread use. An argument in favor
of (1a) is that the user’s Trust PDP is not necessarily able to compute a trust
ranking for all services available. Regarding (2), (2b) is more natural to express
sequences of activities embedded in the application process. Conclusion: For (1),
no alternative is clearly superior. Both depend on the availability of respective
services for users. Our current implementation is similar to (1a). To involve the
user, we choose (2b).
F9 Outgoing web-service calls : Problem: This functionality requires calling the
correct service and route the reply back to the process instance. The PEP-WS
has to use the correct protocol and to perform identity mapping, i. e., get tokens
with pseudonyms valid for the SP called. To do so, it has to decide which identity
to use. Options: Using the ID-WSF protocols and performing identity mapping
is a straightforward implementation task. Alternative ways exist to choose the
correct identity: (1) The BPMS can perform this choice based on a policy and on
the history of the process instance. The policy speciﬁes another process activity
performed before the call. The token, part of the identity information acquired
in this activity, is used for the call. (2) The process itself can make this choice
explicitly: When the process invokes a service, it speciﬁes the identiﬁer of the
token to be used, known from incoming calls or human tasks completed before.
Using FIM in a BPMS – Requirements, Architecture, and Implementation 15
Discussion: (1) is more ﬂexible, but requires process designers to use extended
interfaces when receiving calls or invoking services. With (2), the additional
conﬁguration needed does not aﬀect the application functionality. Moreover,
(2) fulﬁlls D4. Conclusion: We decide to use (1). The BP-PDP evaluates the
respective policy, using history stored in the PIP, and returns a reference to
identity information, which also contains the token.
Miscellaneous F10 Dealing with targetted identities : Problem: Pseudonyms are
speciﬁc to one SP. The goal is to prevent what we call combination of identity
information about one user that is available to diﬀerent SPs. As a BPMS can
execute diﬀerent unrelated applications, combination should also be prevented
between BP instances. Options: We see three alternatives: (1) Let the IdP create
diﬀerent pseudonyms for each process instance. (2) Do not disclose pseudony-
mous identiﬁers to process instances. Instead, perform functions needing them,
such as constraint evaluation, in the BPMS. (3) Perform an internal mapping,
i. e., let the BPMS provide diﬀerent but persistent pseudonyms to process in-
stances. Discussion: (1) would require registering each process instance as a SP
and establish a trust relationship with the IdP. This is not feasible with current
protocols. (3) is quite similar from the perspective of processes, but an eﬃcient
implementation is possible without changing existing protocols. (2) is preferable
according to D4. If the BPMS provides all functionality dealing with identiﬁers
that applications need, there is no additional beneﬁt in having (3) as well. Conclu-
sion: We implement (2), with the option to add (3) later, should we observe that
applications use identiﬁers in ways we cannot easily implement in the BPMS
itself.
F11 Providing proﬁle information to process instances : Problem: One purpose
of attributes is to transfer proﬁle information to an application, cf. Section 2.2.
We need ways to do so automatically, but with user control over the disclosure.
Options: (1) Users often give personal data to BP instances through human tasks
they perform in the worklist handler. We can improve this manual process by
using attribute values: The worklist handler could use attribute values as default
values of form ﬁelds. A conﬁguration determines the mapping between attributes
and form ﬁelds. (2) We can let processes query the PIP for attribute values. There
are diﬀerent ways to achieve this [4]. We also need an interface that can provide
attribute values to BP instances, based on the instance ID and the activity that
has acquired the information. Discussion: One advantage of the ﬁrst way is that
it is declarative and requires no changes in process deﬁnitions, only in deﬁnitons
of human tasks. In addition, the user can control information disclosure in an
intuitive way. However, the process cannot easily determine whether the infor-
mation is authentic, and it is not applicable to identity information acquired by
incoming calls. (2) is more ﬂexible, but how to support BP developers requires
additional exploration. Allowing the user to control disclosure is more challeng-
ing with (2) as well. Conclusion: We think that both approaches are useful and
can complement each other. Our current implementations allows BP instances
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to query attribute values from the PIP, but does not provide for user control yet.
It is relatively easy to add (1) to our implementation of the worklist handler.
 Modeling and transformation 
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BP Instance BP Instance BP Instance 
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Worklist 
Handler 
Web Services 
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WS 
Service 
Discovery 
Trust 
PDP 
WS WS 
PIP 
Token store 
Policy Store 
IdP BP-PDP 
Fig. 2. Architecture of a BPMS with FIM support
4.2 Resulting architecture
Our design decisions result in a reﬁned version (Fig. 2) of the architecture from
Section 2.1, with the following modiﬁcations: (1) The Token Store is introduced
as a storage layer for identity information (F1). It indexes entries by a unique ID
and allows retrieving identiﬁers, attribute values, and the raw security tokens.
(2) Support for SSO is added to the Worklist handler (F2). This requires an
external component, the IdP. Authorization queries now refer to IDs of tokens
acquired through SSO, instead of user names directly (F6). (3) The PEP-WS
is extended to handle identity-web-service calls (incoming and outgoing), cf. F7
and F9. (4) The BP-PDP is split into a stateless and a history-aware part (F4).
(5) Service discovery is enhanced so that it can do user-speciﬁc trust evaluations,
and a Policy store is added (F8). (6) The PIP is extended with an interface that
lets processes query attribute values (F11).
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4.3 Conﬁguration
Our extended BPMS requires diﬀerent kinds of conﬁguration for identity BPs.
First, there are access-control policies for activities, consisting of a stateless part
and additional constraints (cf. F4, and the restrictions explained in F5). Second,
a policy determining the choice of tokens for outgoing calls is needed (F9). These
policies need to be created for each BP deﬁnition, e. g., based on annotations of
a process model. They must be deployed to the BP-PDP when the BP deﬁnition
is deployed to the BP engine.
5 Implementation
We developed the architecture presented in this paper as part of the TAS3
(Trusted Architecture for Securely Shared Services) project. Security, especially
identity management, plays a major role. [6] describes the overall architecture.
The core security architecture [7] is implemented using ZXID [1]. It supports
the main protocols and simpliﬁes the handling of identity information. When-
ever identity information is aquired, ZXID automatically stores it and assigns a
randomly generated ID as a handle. All identity information associated with the
handle is persisted on disk. Thus, diﬀerent components can access it as long as
they run on the same machine. Many ZXID functions, e. g. for calling an identity
web services or sending an authorization request to a PDP, need identity infor-
mation. These functions take a handle as a parameter, thus abstracting from the
internal structure of that information.
The SSO module of ZXID can be implemented in servlets or other tech-
nologies for serving web pages. It handles the entire protocol exchange with
the IdP. On successful completion of SSO, it creates a new session. The web-
service-provider module provides similar functionality for incoming calls. The
web-service-consumer module is the counterpart for outgoing calls. Given a ZXID
session, it performs any necessary activity, like service discovery, identity map-
ping, sending the actual call and validating the result automatically. ZXID also
contains helper functions to call XACML PDPs, automatically extracting at-
tributes from a session and including them in the request. It also parses the
XACML response, allowing to easily determine whether the request has been
granted. In summary, we use ZXID as the implementation-dependent layer and
as the Token store component. Other components are implemented either as
Java servlets or SOAP web services. We use MySQL as a storage backend.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have motivated and described an architecure that combines federated iden-
tity management and business-process management, based on standards in the
two domains. We have described how this architecure is embedded in the overall
architecture of a trust network. Finally, we have brieﬂy explained our imple-
mentation of this architecture using the ZXID library and other open-source
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components. Hence, we oﬀer native support for identity BPs. This allows to
easily create applications that adapt their functionality to the individual user.
Future work will address mechanisms that provide more privacy and allow
more user control over disclosure of identity information, e. g., ﬁltering identity
information sent to third parties based on process- and user-speciﬁc settings.
Finally, the system should be extended to provide identity information to BP
instances.
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